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Abstract 
 
This article looks at business and society on the 
transitional periphery from a starting point rooted in the 
international business literature. Many transitional 
periphery countries have rich natural resource endowments 
or prosperous diasporas, making it relatively easy to 
attract inward FDI, chronic institutional weaknesses and 
policy failures notwithstanding. At the same time, such 
windfalls may dilute incentives for institution building or 
reform. We review trends emerging from the most recent 
scholarly work in the area, and highlight potential 
research agendas for the future.  
  
Introduction 
 
Much has been written about the nature of business and 
society, and the wider governance environment in central 
and Eastern Europe during the almost quarter century since 
the collapse of state socialism (c.f. Lane 2007). In 
contrast, very much less has been written on the 
“transitional periphery”, the more remote post-Soviet 
economies of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other 
peripheral outposts of former state socialist rule. What 
literature there is has tended to concentrate on macro-
economics and politics. However, these economies have 
become increasingly important not only owing to their 
strategic locale, but also in some notable instances, rich 
natural resource endowments that have attracted 
considerable FDI. Others have large diasporas, making for 
specific types of FDI, and policy responses. At the same 
time, they are often associated with corrupt and weak 
institutions, endemic conflicts (both border and internal), 
rising social inequality and the economic exclusion of a 
large proportion of their populations (Demirbag et al., 
2010), leading to highly segmented developmental 
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trajectories. The aim of this special issue is to provide 
new insights into the political economies of the 
transitional periphery from an international business 
perspective. 
 
Context 
 
 
What existing research points to, in many cases, is 
that following on from democratization, a shift to 
authoritarian and top-down leadership (Knox 2008; Murphy 
2006) takes place. In many instances, nationalist agendas 
have been deployed as a substitute for democratic 
accountability (Bingol 2004; c.f. Demetriou 2002). In turn, 
politicians have been ambivalent, and sometimes 
contradictory, in driving economic reform agendas. To 
further complicate things, there appears to be little 
direct connection between the speed and nature of 
liberalization and economic growth, at least in the first 
decade of independence (Pomfret 2000; Spechler 2004). In 
some instances, the leadership has been dominated by Soviet 
era politicians (Murphy 2006) and, in others, placed firmly 
under the sway of quasi-criminal oligarchs. 
Given poor governance, emerging businesses battle with 
shifting rules and the challenges of placating rent seeking 
officials. Moreover, traditional supply chains extending 
into Russia have often been disrupted or broken down (Bevan 
et al. 2001) and, in other instances, continuing ties have 
made for dependence. Firms that do succeed often do so on 
the back of political patronage, making for challenges of 
sustainability in shifting political environments. At the 
same time, there is much diversity in the region, 
reflecting the relative role of diasporas, cultural 
dynamics, and specific historical legacies (Ardichvili and 
Gasparishvili 2001). Again, social protection is stronger 
in the Caucasus (Mitra 2009), providing some protection 
against the ultra-exploitation of labor. Finally, 
Kazakhstan is very much more integrated into global 
financial markets than many other countries in the region, 
making it particularly vulnerable to systemic shocks 
(ibid.). 
 
The Transitional Periphery, Resources and FDI 
 
 A number of these countries are resource rich which 
creates an imbalanced national production with over-
reliance on single source national revenue. As such, the 
3 
 
experiences of oil and gas rich countries demonstrate that 
other segments of national economies may even be neglected. 
Further, overvalued currencies, regional imbalances, and 
institutional fluidity, and hence rising corruption, are 
common patterns amongst some resource rich transitional 
economies. (Ross 1999). Indeed, there is much evidence that 
this process is already well under way, even while oil 
resources are fast depleting (c.f. Van Wijnbergen and 
Budina 2011; Asadov 2005). In addition, all countries have 
faced rising social inequality, uneven and underdeveloped 
consumer markets, and potentially destabilizing levels of 
youth unemployment (Tarkhnishvili et al. 2005; Roberts and 
Pollack 2009). A further phenomenon has been the rise of 
quasi-states in the Caucasus (for example, Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia), disrupting trade and markets and 
making for open-ended tensions. 
Despite this, natural resource endowments and, in some 
instances, historic links and/or prosperous diasporas have 
meant that countries on the transitional periphery have 
also become important destinations for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and multinational firms’ (MNCs) 
operations. FDI flows to the transitional periphery not 
only from Western developed economies, but also from other 
emerging countries and regions (South-South FDI) (UNCTAD, 
2006). Given the transitional nature of institutions and 
complexities associated with governance of organizations, 
management of relations with governments, political elites, 
and trade unions appear to be increasingly challenging 
(Demirbag et al., 1998; Demirbag et al., 2010; Upchurch, 
2012). Countries on the periphery of transition have 
administrative heritages which are significantly different 
than those of other emerging regions (Lubatkin et al., 
1997) which present their own unique sets of challenges for 
developed and emerging market MNEs.  
To date, transitional countries on the periphery are 
still a terra incognita and our stock of knowledge in 
business and management practices remain mired in anecdotal 
evidence. Given the importance of these resource rich 
countries and potential for investment, the neglect of 
publications focusing on periphery of transition is 
astonishing. Over the last two decades these countries have 
been undergoing profound and uneven institutional 
transformations which have ramifications for both emerging 
and developed country MNCs. Institutional settings in 
periphery of transition often necessitates MNCs to design 
different strategies to deal with the complex competitive 
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dynamics in these countries (Batra, 1997; Demirbag et al., 
1998; Kaynak et al., 2007).  
 
Conceptualizing Institutions on the Transitional Periphery 
 
But what types of institutional arrangements are 
encountered on the transitional periphery; and how are 
these likely to impact on firm behavior? The influential 
legal origin approach to institutions suggests that legal 
systems will be the ultimate determinant of firm behavior. 
It is held that all property rights depend on the law. A 
key distinction is between common law countries and civil 
law; in the former property rights are stronger, but in the 
latter they are mediated by the rights of other 
stakeholders (La Porta et al. 1999). La Porta et al. (1999) 
originally came up with a Soviet legal origin category, but 
later suggested that, over time, transitional countries 
would tend towards German legal origin, a type of civil 
law, reflecting long term legacies (c.f. La Porta et al. 
2007). However, this approach tends to neglect the effects 
of variations in state enforcement capabilities, and the 
type of legislation enacted by parliaments; even in common 
law countries, key dimensions of corporate law are 
statutory, and not judge-made (Armour et al. 2009). This 
could reflect the wide disparity in economic performance of 
the transitional peripheral countries, supposed similar 
legal origin notwithstanding. 
 
In contrast, the literature on comparative capitalism 
argues that national economic development and growth 
reflects a complex web of institutional realities and 
associated social relations (Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 
1999). This literature initially concentrated on the 
developed world, with a key distinction being made between 
liberal market (or Anglo American) and coordinated market 
economies (the most developed continental European 
economies and Japan) (ibid.). It was held that, over time, 
other countries would evolve to one or other of these 
mature models (Hall and Soskice 2001). Later work sought to 
identify additional archetypes, inter alia, to explain the 
distinct and persistent features of the Mediterranean (or 
mixed market) economies and the emerging markets of Central 
and Eastern Europe (emerging market economies) (Hancke et 
al. 2007;  Lane 2007). There have also been efforts to 
identify different types of capitalism encountered in 
developing economies in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere 
(see for example, Wood and Frynas 2006; Wood et al. 2010). 
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Despite common pressures on liberalization, it is evident 
that many national economies are likely to retain distinct 
features, and this will account for persistent differences 
in types of corporate behavior. A real risk, however, is 
that more and more different types of capitalism are 
identified, until theoretical parsimony and analytical ease 
is lost. Again, many emerging markets have common features, 
including a strong segmentation between large firms and the 
state sector on the one hand, and the SME and informal 
sectors on the other. Such economies are also characterized 
by uneven institutional coverage on spatial lines, with 
much difference between the metropole and more 
geographically remote regions. 
 
In practice, one can identify three different categories of 
state within the transitional periphery. Firstly, there are 
those countries associated with significant oil and gas 
reserves (e.g. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan). Here, given 
weaknesses in regulation and political culture, the main 
concern has been with the regulation and management of the 
oil and gas sector, with a tendency to either neglect other 
areas of the economy or to cross-subsidize them in the 
interests of maximizing rents or dispensing patronage (c.f. 
Asadof 2005). Secondly, there are diaspora driven 
economies, such as Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Here, it 
is possible for consumption and growth to take place that 
is at least semi-divorced from production (see Gevorkyan 
and Gevorkyan 2012). Investment decisions tend to be 
motivated by senses of history and historical 
responsibility, and personal ties, rather than financial 
criteria (Nielson and Riddle 2009). With this goes a 
tendency for politicians to neglect institution building or 
be concerned with sustainability, as they can be assured of 
an ongoing flow of funds from abroad. As the economy is 
geared to servicing the diaspora, who have insider contacts 
and insights, it means that other types of investor are 
proportionately disadvantaged. However, such investments 
may make a very substantial contribution to local 
capabilities and production networks (Plaza 2008), and more 
effective regulation and management can make for more 
sustainable growth (Gevorkyan and Gevorkyan 2012). Thirdly, 
there are those economies that do not enjoy oil and gas 
endowments and cannot count on being kept afloat from 
abroad; hence, FDI inflows into such economies have been 
relatively poor. Such economies, however, do not seem to 
have been much better at institution building than those in 
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the other two categories (c.f. Boerzel and Pamuk 2012). Nor 
have politicians in such economies always proven very 
responsible, in some cases, experimenting with war as a 
solution to problems they experience and, in others, being 
primarily concerned with centralizing power and resources 
around their clans. Anti-corruption measures adopted in 
order to facilitate increased ties with European states has 
been used as a tool to secure and consolidate political 
power; hence, the influence of the EU appears not so much 
to have made things more democratic, sustainable or less 
corrupt, but rather to stabilize existing political trends 
and tendencies (Boerzel and Pamuk 2012). 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
 
In the following article, Kedia and Bilgili examine the 
importance of historical ties for equity share acquired in 
acquisitions by MNEs. They examine equity share ownership 
decisions of MNEs from an institutional perspective when 
MNEs acquire their targets in the transition post-Soviet 
economies of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their findings 
highlight the importance of historical ties and regulative 
distance between home and host countries of acquisitions in 
the transitional periphery as historical ties increase the 
likelihood of higher ownership rate. 
 
Mazhikeyev, Edwars and Rizow, however, look at the impact 
of institutional reforms (openness) and trade performance 
of Central Asian Republics. By adopting a gravity analysis 
approach, this paper highlights trade performance achieved 
by “more isolationist” states such as Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and countries with “more open” 
policies (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). It emerges that more 
isolationist countries over relied on natural resource 
related revenue streams to hike their international trade, 
while more “open policy” countries such as Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan achieved significantly higher trade performance.  
 
Croucher focuses on labor relations in one of the key 
players of transitional periphery countries. His analysis 
focuses on Kazakhstan’s oil and gas MNEs. Croucher’s study 
supports the argument that a global system of industrial 
relations is emerging, which contributes to the convergence 
and divergence debate. 
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Demirbag, McGuinness, Wood and Bayyurt focus on 
reinvestment decisions of MNEs operating in transitional 
periphery countries. This study highlights the relationship 
between different dimensions of corruption, institutional 
environment and reinvestment decisions by MNEs in the 
transitional periphery. The study further examines the 
differing influence of arbitrary and pervasive corruption 
on reinvestments of MNEs between transitional periphery and 
post-soviet transitional EU member economies. This paper 
contributes institutional theory by extending the variety 
of capitalism literature and formal institution’s impact on 
reinvestment decisions. It emerges that the role of 
informal institutions becomes increasingly critical in 
reinvestment decisions of MNEs as government agencies 
arbitrarily and pervasively interact differently in 
differing legal and political systems. 
 
Danilovich and Croucher focus on investment in personnel in 
Belarussian enterprises. What emerges from their study  
indicate that since the beginning of the global financial 
crisis there appears to be lesser investment in human 
resources which adversely affects capacity to attract FDI 
and modernize existing enterprises in Belarus. Danilovich 
and Croucher further argue that without modernization and 
FDI injection the existing business model of Belarussian 
enterprises may be unsustainable. 
 
Serafini and Szamosi examine the level of implementation of 
HRM policies and practices in hotels of an MNE hotel chain 
both in the transitional periphery and advanced economies 
in a comparative manner. By examining an MNE’s HRM 
practices in Caucasus and Central Asia through an in depth 
case study, Serafini and Szamosi identify a number of 
dissimilarities in terms of HRM practices. By adopting 
Whitley’s employer/employee interdependence dimension, they 
identify differences in practices such as flexibility of 
employment, outsourcing and dismissal procedures. Despite 
such differences between socio-economic environments in 
respective countries, the luxury hospitality MNEs are able 
to implement uniform HRM policies and practices in 
transitional periphery and advanced economies. 
 
Akbar and Kisilowski address the question of non-market 
strategies of businesses in the transitional periphery. 
They examine non-market strategies in accordance with 
countries’ institutional development level. This 
exploratory study enhances our understanding of non-market 
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strategies by comparing MNE subsidiaries with local firms 
both in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Akbar and 
Kisilowski argue that low level economic and political 
institutionalization triggers local firms to use more 
proactive and high risk non-market strategies whereas in 
EEC countries which have relatively higher levels of 
institutional development both local firms and MNEs use 
more proactive non-market strategies. 
 
 
Aslan, Larimo and Tarba examine Nordic MNEs’ investments in 
the transitional periphery. They expand the market entry 
and establishment mode decision of MNEs by looking at 
institutional and firm level factors’ influencing Nordic 
MNEs’ decisions when entering Eastern Europe, Russia and 
transitional periphery countries. Aslan et al., argue that 
in high risk transitional periphery countries Nordic MNEs 
tend to opt for green-field joint ventures whereas in low 
risk (high growth) countries these firms tend to prefer 
full acquisitions. This may be an important addition to 
variety of capitalism argument as institutional fluidity is 
higher in transitional periphery countries. 
 
 
Gevorkyan examines conditions in the duo of Armenia and 
Georgia in the Caucasus region. His analyses focus on 
foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, human capital, and 
diaspora effects on social and economic transformation in 
these two countries of the transitional periphery. 
Gevorkyan argues that, despite their shared legacy, Armenia 
and Georgia are institutionally different economies. While 
Georgia adopts capitalist market structures faster than 
Armenia, Armenia appears to have more entrepreneurial and 
innovative capacity, yet both countries are struggling to 
recover from the adverse impact of the latest financial 
crisis to progress their structural transformations. 
 
 
Majkhmadshoev, Ibeh and Crone examine institutional 
influences on SMEs’ export performance in two key 
transitional periphery countries of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. From an institutionalist starting point, they 
explore the effects of variations in context on SMEs. While 
both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan share some common legacies 
from the Soviet era, there seem to be significant 
divergences in their current institutional environments 
which affect Tajikistan relatively more adversely than 
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Kyrgyzstan. Despite a shared legacy, Kyrgyzstan has adopted 
a more open policy to accelerate market transformation 
which seems to create better performing SMEs compared to 
Tajikistan. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In exploring the role of international business in emerging 
markets, there has been a remarkable tendency to neglect 
the transitional periphery. Yet, flowing from a rich 
tradition of political and economic scholarship on the 
regions encompassed by this special issue, there is now a 
growing critical mass of work in this area. The editors 
were encouraged by the large number of high quality 
submissions attracted by the call for papers for this 
special issue. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
include more than a sample of the best work on the subject. 
It is hoped that the papers in this collection will promote 
further international business scholarship in the region 
and, indeed, in other regions where similar forces are at 
play, including resource rich economies, diaspora 
orientated economies, and those that have experienced state 
socialist experiments. 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
Ardichvili, A. and Gasparishvili, A. 2001. “Socio-cultural 
Values, Internal Work Culture and Leadership Styles in Four 
Post-communist Countries: Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic”, International Journal of Cross-
Cultural Management, 1, 2: 227. 
 
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M. and Singh, A. 
2009. “Shareholder protection and stock market development: 
an empirical test of the legal origins hypothesis”, Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies 6: 343-380. 
 
Asadov, F. 2005. “The public oversight of oil projects in 
Azerbaijan, 2004-2007”, International Social Science 
Journal, 57, 1: Supplement – 93-106. 
 
10 
 
Batra, R. 1997. Marketing issues and challenges in 
transitional economies, Journal of International Marketing, 
5(4):95-114. 
 
Bevan, A., Estrin, S., Hare, P. and Stern, J. 2001. 
“Extending the economics of disorganization”, Economics of 
Transition, 9, 1: 105-114. 
 
Börzel, T. A., & Pamuk, Y. 2012. “Pathologies of 
Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus”, West European Politics, 35, 1: 79-97. 
 
Bingol, Y. 2004. “Nationalism and democracy in post-
communist Central Asia”, Asian Ethnicity, 5, 1: 43-60. 
 
Demetriou, S. 2002. “Rising From the Ashes? The Difficult 
(Re)Birth of the Georgian State”, Development and Change, 
33, 5: 859-883. 
 
Demirbag, M., McGuiness, M., and Altay, H. 2010. 
“Perceptions of institutional environment and entry mode: 
FDI from an emerging country”, Management International 
Review, 2010, 50(2): 207-240. 
 
Demirbag, M., Mirza, H., and Gunes, R. 1998. Political risk 
management: A case study of Turkish Companies in Central 
Asia and Russia”, in Mirza, H. (Ed.) Global Competitive 
Strategies in the New World Economy, pp.283-309, London: 
Edward Elgar. 
  
Gevorkyan, A. V. and Gevorkyan, A. V. 2012. “Factoring 
Turbulence Out: Diaspora Regulatory Mechanism and Migration 
Development Bank”, International Migration, 50: 96–112. 
 
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. 2001. An Introduction to the 
Varieties of Capitalism. In P. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Basis of 
Competitive Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hancke, B., Rhodes, M. and Thatcher, M. 2007. Introduction. 
In B. Hancke, M. Rhodes and M. Thatcher (eds.), Beyond 
varieties of capitalism: conflict, contradiction, and 
complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Kaynak, E., Demirbag, M., and Tatoglu, E. 2007. 
Determinants of ownership based entry mode choice of MNCs: 
11 
 
Evidence from Mongolia, Management International Review, 
2007, 47(4): 505-530. 
 
Knox, C. 2008. “Kazakhstan: modernizing government in the 
context of political inertia”, International Review of the 
Administrative Sciences, 74, 3: 477-496. 
 
Lane, D. 2007. ‘Post-State Socialism: A Diversity of 
Capitalisms?’ in D. Lane and M. Myant (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries, pp. 13-39. London: 
Palgrave. 
 
La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer,  A. 1999. 
Corporate Ownership around the World. The Journal of 
Finance, 54, 2, 471-517. 
 
La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2007. The 
economic consequences of legal origins (No. w13608). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Lubatkin, M.H., Ndaiye, M., and Vengroff, R. 1997. ”The 
nature of managerial work in developing countries: A limited 
test of the universalist hypothesis”, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 28(4):711-733. 
 
Mitra, P. 2009. “The Impact of Global Financial Crisis and 
Policy Responses: The Caucasus, Central Asia and Mongolia”, 
Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 2, 2: 189-230. 
 
Murphy, J. 2006. “Illusory Transition? Elite Reconstitution 
in Kazakhstan, 1989 – 2002”, Europe Asia Studies, 52, 3: 
523-547. 
 
Nielsen, T. M., & Riddle, L. 2009. “Investing in peace: the 
motivational dynamics of diaspora investment in post-
conflict economies”, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 4: 
435-448. 
 
Plaza, S. 2008. “Mobilizing the Diaspora: Creating an 
Enabling Environment for Trade, Investment, Knowledge 
Transfer and Enterprise Development, Africa's Finances: The 
Contribution of Remittances, 27, 56, : 27-56. 
  
Pomfret, R. 2000. “The Uzbek Model of Economic Development, 
1991–91”, Economics of Transition, 8, 3, 733-748. 
 
12 
 
Roberts, K. and Pollack, G. 2009. “New class divisions in 
the new market economies: evidence from the careers of 
young adults in post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia”, Journal of Youth Studies, 12, 5: 579-596. 
 
Ross, M. L. 1999. "The political economy of the resource 
curse". World Politics 51 (2): 297–322. 
 
Spechler, M. 2004. “Uzbekistan: the silk road to nowhere?”, 
Contemporary Economic Policy, 18, 3, 295-303. 
 
Tarkhnishvili, L., Voskanyan, A., Tholen, J. and Roberts, 
K. 2005. “Waiting for the Market: Young Adults in Telavi 
and Vanadzor”, Journal of Youth Studies, 8, 3: 313-330. 
 
UNCTAD. 2006. World Investment Report, 2006: FDI from 
Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for 
Development, United Nations, New York. 
 
Upchurch, M. 2012. “Explaining persistence of 
dysfunctionality in post-communist transformation”, in 
Wood, G., and Demirbag, M., Handbook of Institutional 
Approaches in International Business, London: Edward Elgar. 
 
van Wijnbergen, S. and Budina, N. 2011. “Fiscal 
sustainability, volatility and oil wealth”, Economics of 
Transition, 19, 4: 639-799. 
 
Whitley, R. 1999. Divergent Capitalisms: The Social 
Structuring and Change of Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Wood, G., Dibben, P., Stride, C. and Webster, E. 2010. 
“'HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, Path Dependence or 
Segmented Business System?”, Journal of World Business, 46, 
1: 31-41. 
 
Wood, G. and Frynas, G. 2006. The Institutional Basis of 
Economic Failure: Anatomy of the Segmented Business System, 
Socio-Economic Review, 4 (2): 239-277. 
 
 
 
 
